The corruption charges levelled at Victor Ponta have triggered a major political crisis in Romania by Brett, Daniel
7/15/2015
The corruption charges levelled at Victor Ponta have triggered a
major political crisis in Romania
blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/07/15/the-corruption-charges-levelled-at-victor-ponta-have-triggered-a-major-political-crisis-in-romania/
Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta has been charged with corruption, following a long-running
investigation. Daniel Brett writes on the likely consequences of the charges, with Ponta resigning
from the leadership of his governing Social Democratic Party (PSD), but refusing to vacate the oﬃce
of Prime Minister. He argues that the early signs are the PSD intend to use the scandal to attempt to
undermine wider anti-corruption eﬀorts.
The announcement of corruption charges against Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta of the
Social Democratic Party (PSD) by the country’s anti-corruption agency, DNA, has triggered a major
political crisis. In light of the accusations, President Klaus Iohannis of the rival National Liberal Party (PNL) has
asked Ponta to resign as Prime Minister. Although Ponta has resigned as President of the PSD he has refused to
quit as Prime Minister, claiming innocence and that his resignation would trigger a crisis. The situation was made
more complex by the fact that in order for Ponta to be fully investigated, he will need to have his parliamentary
immunity lifted, which the parliament has thus far refused to do.
As a result, a dispute has emerged that threatens to plunge Romania into another sustained political crisis and
polarise it further some six months after the presidential election. An impasse has emerged as Ponta refuses to
resign, parliament refuses to lift his immunity, and the president, despite his wishes, has no power to sack Ponta or
to force parliament into removing his immunity.
What is the scandal about?
Ponta stands accused of tax evasion and using forged invoices to buy cars and property. His immunity means that
he can only be investigated for crimes that occurred before he took oﬃce. The accusations date to before he
became Prime Minister, when he was working as a lawyer. However, the investigations are only likely to increase
and to delve more deeply into Ponta’s ﬁnancial dealings. As discussed previously, since the election, the number of
corruption cases being launched and successfully prosecuted has increased, reaching the top levels of the PSD,
with Ponta and key allies having investigations launched into their activities and some being convicted.
Under Laura Kövesi, prosecutions and convictions have accelerated since 2013, with over 1,000 prosecutions being
brought in 2014 and twenty-four mayors, ﬁve parliamentarians, two ex-ministers, seven judges, thirteen prosecutors
and former Prime Minister Adrian Năstase convicted. The cases serve to further undermine the Romanian elite, as
more details, as well as cash and paintings, emerge. Bribery accusations often take a bizarre and comical turn here;
one former judge was probed for smuggling goats to Russia, a minister was convicted for taking sausages (and
$17,000) as bribes, a third was investigated for accepting bags of cash in a cemetery, and Năstase took bribes in
the form of double glazed windows.
The accusations and convictions have not been limited to ﬁnancial crimes; last month former Interior Minister and
PSD baron Liviu Dragnea was convicted and given a suspended sentence for electoral fraud relating to the 2012
attempted impeachment of then President Băsescu. Although he resigned as regional development minister after
his conviction, Dragnea remains a vice president of the PSD and a prominent MP.
Mission impossible? Why Ponta cannot be removed
Despite calls from Iohannis for Ponta to resign, along with public pressure for him to go, Ponta has thus far refused
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to consider resigning. It may strike some readers as odd that a Prime Minister accused of criminal activity cannot be
forced out of oﬃce. While there are a number of mechanisms that allow for the removal of the President, fewer exist
for removing the Prime Minister. Constitutionally, the President does not have the power to dismiss the Prime
Minister. While the constitutional court can advise on attempts to remove the President and arbitrate in disputes
between the President and Prime Minister, it cannot remove the Prime Minister. A Prime Minister can be removed if
they are disqualiﬁed from holding oﬃce, such as if they are convicted, but until that time the only way in which they
can be removed is through the loss of parliamentary support.
This situation exists in part because confrontational
cohabitation between the President and Prime
Minister was never envisaged when the constitution
was drawn up. At that time, presidential and
parliamentary elections were simultaneous, so the
party or alliance of the President would also be the
largest group in parliament. The President, although
constitutionally lacking in power, became during the
1990s the de facto dominant political actor with the
Prime Minister as his subordinate .
Thus a President with parliamentary support could
bring about the dismissal of the Prime Minister.
However, since 2004, the elections for parliament and
President have taken place separately, and since
2012, this has resulted in cohabitation, with President
and parliament coming from parties that oppose one
another. With cohabitation, conﬂict has emerged
between the two oﬃces, including the attempted
impeachment of Băsescu in the summer of 2012.
Parliamentary elections are not scheduled until 2016. Romania is also unusual in that since 1989 all parliaments
have served out their full terms. With a healthy parliamentary majority it is unlikely that the government will collapse,
nor are they likely to call early elections. Thus the only way in which Ponta can be forced out of oﬃce is via
parliament losing conﬁdence in him and voting his government down. The million-dollar question is whether the PSD
will choose to remove Ponta, or whether they will brazen it out.
Ponta’s background
To the outsider, as well as to many Romanians, Romanian politics can seem illogical. For example, it seems likely
that the PSD will continue to support Ponta. This may seem odd; after all, he lost the presidential election by a
considerable margin, he’s been dogged by accusations of plagiarism that would have brought him down in many
other countries, some of his closest ministers colleagues and patrons have been arrested or accused of corruption,
and now he and his family have been accused of corruption. But Ponta, like much of the PSD, has shown
remarkable resistance and a steadfast refusal to leave oﬃce despite scandal after scandal since becoming Prime
Minister.
Ponta’s public image is that of a child wearing Mickey Mouse ears, being manipulated from behind the scenes by
the evil former President and prominent PSD member Ion Iliescu, or as Pinocchio (an allusion to his frequent lies), or
as someone who will never miss an opportunity to jump on a bandwagon or to say anything to gain or maintain
power, no matter how ridiculous.
At the same time, there are concerns that he is in fact a sinister politician who desires to gain and hold onto power.
His willingness to exploit nationalism and religion during the election campaign, to attempt to remove President
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Basescu, and to ignore or rewrite the constitution to suit his aims, along with his attempt to suppress the vote of the
diaspora, shows a politician prepared to push the limits. But the inability to decide if he is a Romanian Viktor Orban
or Mickey Mouse works to Ponta’s advantage, as he is taken less seriously than he might be.
Ponta’s personality frequently comes to the fore in press conferences: he is often defensive and prickly with
journalists, attacking them for asking him questions and calling into doubt their credentials. Ponta’s evasiveness
cultivates a persona of a şmecher or descurcăreţ – a street wise guy who will sort things out by virtue of his wits,
outsmarting the gendarme. His attitude is that he is smarter than you and that you will never catch him because of
this. It is hard to work out if this is his real character or a play to the cameras in the belief that the Romanian public
respect and admire these characteristics.
During the presidential election campaign in November last year, Ponta was willing to say or do anything to get
elected. In perhaps one last throw of the dice, he is attempting to shore up support by launching a series of tax cuts
against the advice of the IMF and the European Commission. The reason why he is able to do this is because anti-
corruption eﬀorts appear to have led to a reduction in tax avoidance, meaning that there is more money ﬂowing in.
One of the more eﬀective PSD arguments in the election campaign was to portray themselves as the party that
increased pensions and wages, while Iohannis and the PNL were the party who voted to cut them. This move
seems to be designed to repeat this, even though the EU and IMF are warning that the country cannot aﬀord these
cuts. This again highlights Ponta as a short-term politician who will play fast and loose with the economy in order to
gain support to save his own skin with little regard to the long-term.
Ponta and the PSD
We might assume that a politician who can still command the support of the party even after the accusations levelled
against him – not to mention his previous failures – must have a strong power base in the party. However, the reality
is perhaps the reverse. One of the reasons why Ponta is not taken seriously is because he is seen as the puppet
rather than the puppet master within the PSD. Ponta’s weakness and the hold that the so called ‘barons’ have over
him are precisely why they keep him in place. Secondly, the emergence of an alternative who is neither tainted by
corruption nor seen as belonging to a particular faction is unlikely.
Although the PSD is often spoken of as a ‘centre-left’ party, this overstates the interest that the PSD has in social
justice. Put simply, for the PSD, social justice equates to increasing pensions for the elderly and wages for state
employees as a form of electoral bribery. The PSD is a party which electorally draws upon the support of transition
‘losers’: those on the economic, social and physical margins, but whose party elite is almost entirely drawn from the
newly rich, the well-connected and those already embedded in power networks, some since before 1989.
The accusations against Liviu Dragnea, a newly wealthy businessman and politician, provide a useful snapshot of
why the barons are so vulnerable to prosecution, why they stand to lose so much if jailed, and why they are
therefore so keen to see anti-corruption eﬀorts stopped. Dragnea is not an isolated case, and it illustrates how
various individuals rose to the position of baron.
After his election as a local councillor in Teleorman (one of the poorer regions of Romania), in 2000 Dragnea
privatised the state owned construction company. The auction for the company was won by Dragnea’s driver. The
council, headed by Dragnea, then gave building contracts to the company at inﬂated prices. The relationship
continued, and Dragnea now stands accused of buying a hotel cheaply and selling it for a proﬁt to his driver, who
then returned the property to Dragnea. Dragnea was not a rich man before beginning in politics; he now owns
numerous properties and land across Romania with no clear source of income. He built a political and ﬁnancial
power base locally, which developed through patronage supporter networks, and then moved upwards into national
politics, where he gained prominence behind the scenes in the PSD before taking on a more public proﬁle.
An example of how the networks function, and how politicians can reward followers and thank patrons, is through
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giving jobs to members of the family. One notable case is that of the son of convicted former Prime Minister Adrian
Năstase. Mihnea Năstase, despite minimal qualiﬁcations, was deemed suitable to work as a personal assistant to a
PSD MEP in Brussels, earning a salary of 1,500 euros per month, almost four times the median monthly salary in
Romania. The Năstase case emphasises the two-tier nature of Romanian society and how only those with
connections can secure access to a fast-tracked career in politics or within public institutions.
Many barons were not wealthy men and women who entered politics on the back of their wealth; rather, they have
become wealthy through their involvement in politics. Their power and wealth is predicated on their ability to reward
their patronage networks. Anti-corruption thus challenges the foundations of the patronage system upon which the
PSD depends.
Shortly before the elections, a report emerged of Ponta being berated by a group of barons for failing to keep them
out of jail. One cannot imagine a situation where the barons would shout at Iliescu or Năstase. Ponta plays a useful
role for the PSD barons. His relatively weak position in the party and his dependence upon them for support means
that the barons call the shots. With so many of them under investigation themselves, Ponta’s case distracts attention
from them. The prosecution also opens up opportunities for the PSD and their allies who want to see an end to anti-
corruption eﬀorts.
Likely consequences
There are two potential scenarios. The ﬁrst is that Ponta and the PSD succumb to the pressure and Ponta resigns,
and then the PSD ﬁnds a replacement who can both hold the party together and lead it into the 2016 elections. The
second scenario is that the PSD tries to hold onto power and uses the attempt to impeach Ponta as a tool with
which to attack the DNA, Iohannis and anti-corruption eﬀorts. Based on events since the news broke, it is clear that
the PSD is adopting the latter strategy.
The PSD line of attack is to argue that the DNA is over-reaching, and that democracy is under threat from its work.
They claim that it is engaged in a power grab and is using corruption charges to suppress opposition to it. To this
end, Ponta and his supporters have invoked the way in which the legal system was politicised under communism
and used by the Communists to jail their opponents. Ponta’s ally, former Liberal Prime Minister and now PSD ally
chairman of the Senate Călin Popescu–Tăriceanu, has attacked the DNA and called for the dismissal of Kövesi and
Livia Stanciu, the head of the High Court.
At the same time, parliament is attempting to pass amendments to the penal code to make it virtually impossible to
prosecute politicians. It is likely that if these changes are passed by parliament, they will be vetoed by Iohannis and
will eventually ﬁnd their way to the constitutional court. All the while, these debates and rows will serve to distract
from Ponta’s own case and those of other members of the PSD.
The second line of attack is to continue the attempt to further polarise Romanian society. This is an extension of the
discourse the PSD deployed during the presidential election, when they sought to disenfranchise the diaspora by
preventing them from voting. Former Interior Minister Ioan Rus attacked the diaspora, saying that while men left for
1,500 euros, their wives were forced into prostitution at home while they were away.
Much of the key commercial media in Romania is owned by barons who support the PSD, particularly the Antena
channels. These drive home the PSD’s narrative of two Romanias: those who are left dictating aﬀairs at home, and
those who are abroad, out of touch and not true Romanians. Such an argument appeals to the PSD’s core
electorate. The PSD is also counting on the fact that while Romanians were willing to come onto the streets in 2011
in opposition to austerity and in support of Raed Arafat, they are less willing to come onto the street in support of
Kovasi, Stanciu and the DNA.
If the PSD is playing a long game, they are hoping that the longer it drags out, the more disillusioned Iohannis’s
supporters will become, and the more likely they will be to stay at home in the parliamentary elections. A low turnout
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favours the PSD, who have a core (but diminishing) electorate.
Iohannis is often criticised for not being assertive. His critics in the press and elsewhere lament that he is not an
‘interventionist President’ and that he ought to do more. It is something of a paradox: the very things that the media
and intellectuals criticised Băsescu for doing, they criticise Iohannis for not doing. A case in point is the criticism of
Iohannis for allowing Ponta to control foreign policy, as the constitution does not give the President control over this
sphere. In fact, the President has very few powers over policy or politics.
Thus we have a President who is criticised for following the constitution rather than the behavioural patterns of
previous Presidents. For many Romanian politicians, their adherence to the constitution and democracy (much like
their adherence to religion, nationalism and social justice) is rhetorical and selective. When it suits their short-term
needs, they invoke the constitution as a sacrosanct document; when the constitution is not in their favour, they
ignore it. Thus in 2012, during the conﬂict with Băsescu, Ponta and his allies talked of rewriting the constitution or
ignoring the constitutional court. Now, under increasing pressure from Iohannis to resign, Ponta invokes the
constitution as his justiﬁcation for staying on. Similarly, they invoke democracy when it suits them.
The Romanian opposition parties have been ineﬀective thus far in mobilising the population or oﬀering up any kind
of strategy for removing Ponta beyond symbolic votes of conﬁdence. In part this reﬂects a lack of leadership among
the centre-right, which is dominated by politicians with large egos and limited electoral appeal. Furthermore, the
PNL, PD-L and UDMR have as much of a corruption problem as the PSD, so while they might crave the fall of
Ponta, privately they are equally happy to see anti-corruption eﬀorts stalled or rolled back.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/1HtlP09
 _________________________________
About the author
Daniel Brett – Open University
Daniel Brett is an Associate Lecturer at the Open University, he has previously taught at Indiana
University and at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (UCL). He works on
contemporary Romania, rural politics and historical democratisation.
5/5
